MIRANDA VS ARIZONA
A mug shot of Ernesto Miranda, whose wrongful conviction led
to the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court held that detained
criminal suspects must be informed of their rights prior to police
questioning.
Reproduction courtesy of the Arizona Department of
Corrections Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Supreme Court
ruled that detained criminal suspects, prior to police questioning, must be
informed of their constitutional right to an attorney and against
self-incrimination. The case began with the 1963 arrest of Phoenix resident
Ernesto Miranda, who was charged with rape, kidnapping, and robbery. Miranda
was not informed of his rights prior to the police interrogation. During the
two-hour interrogation, Miranda allegedly confessed to committing the crimes,
which the police apparently recorded. Miranda, who had not finished ninth grade
and had a history of mental instability, had no counsel present. At trial, the
prosecution's case consisted solely of his confession. Miranda was convicted of
both rape and kidnapping and sentenced to 20 to 30 years in prison. He appealed
to the Arizona Supreme Court, claiming that the police had unconstitutionally
obtained his confession. The court disagreed, however, and upheld the
conviction. Miranda appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reviewed the case
in 1966.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, ruled that the
prosecution could not introduce Miranda's confession as evidence in a criminal
trial because the police had failed to first inform Miranda of his right to an
attorney and against self-incrimination. The police duty to give these warnings
is compelled by the Constitution's Fifth Amendment, which gives a criminal suspect
the right to refuse "to be a witness against himself," and Sixth Amendment,
which guarantees criminal defendants the right to an attorney.
The
Court maintained that the defendant's right against self-incrimination has long
been part of Anglo-American law as a means to equalize the vulnerability
inherent in being detained. Such a position, unchecked, can often lead to
government abuse. For example, the Court cited the continued high incidence of
police violence designed to compel confessions from a suspect. This and other
forms of intimidation, maintained the Court, deprive criminal suspects of their
basic liberties and can lead to false confessions. The defendant's right to an
attorney is an equally fundamental right, because the presence of an attorney
in interrogations, according to Chief Justice Warren, enables "the defendant
under otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear,
effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogations
process."
Without these two fundamental rights, both of which, the
Court ruled, "dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings," "no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice."
Thus, to protect these rights in the face of widespread
ignorance of the law, the Court devised statements that the police are required
to tell a defendant who is being detained and interrogated. These mandatory "Miranda
Rights" begin with "the right to remain silent," and continue
with the statement that "anything said can and will be used against [the
defendant] in a court of law." The police are further compelled to inform the
suspect of his or her right to an attorney and allow for (or, if necessary,
provide for) a defendant's attorney who can accompany him during
interrogations. Because none of these rights was afforded to Ernesto Miranda
and his "confession" was thus unconstitutionally admitted at trial, his
conviction was reversed. Miranda was later retried and convicted without the
admission of his confession.
Miranda v. Arizona, in creating the
"Miranda Rights" we take for granted today, reconciled the increasing police
powers of the state with the basic rights of individuals. Miranda remains good law
today.
AUTHOR'S BIO
Alex McBride is a third year law
student at Tulane Law School in New Orleans. He is articles editor on the
TULANE LAW REVIEW and the 2005 recipient of the Ray Forrester Award in
Constitutional Law. In 2007, Alex will be clerking with Judge Susan Braden on
the United States Court of Federal Claims in Washington.
*THIS IS A NEWS PAPER ARTICLE I DID NOT MAKE THIS I GIVE FULL CREDIT TOhttp://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/rights/landmark_miranda.html *
MY THOUGHTS ON THE ARTICLE
THIS IS A GOOD ARTICLE TO FIND OUT ABOUT WHEN THE MIRANDA RIGHTS WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED AND WHAT GAVE THE COURT THE IDEA TO CREATE A SUCH POWERFUL AND MEANFUL LAW THAT MUST BE USE WHILE BEING ARRESTED OR BEING TAKEN IN FOR QUESTIONING.ALSO THIS ARTICLE GIVE ACCURATE DATES AND OTHER INFORMATION.